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the executor or administrator seeking a direction to complete the
contract, the result of such a decree would be in practical effect specific
performance. It does, therefore, seem superfluous to require the
legal representative to go to the extent of securing a decree in equity
to accomplish the performance of a valid contract for the sale of land
made by the decedent, when all that is sought is a conveyance of
legal title to the equitable owner.
The enactment of this legislation was therefore advantageous,
as it enables purchasers entitled to deeds under contracts with decedents to receive them without delay and difficulty attendant upon
compliance with the law as it existed previously. The section as now
revised is sufficiently clear, although not as positively worded as the
comparable New Jersey statute cited. There is, however, probably
much to be said for New York's inclusion of the option given to the
legal representative to seek court approval, as this procedure would
be desirable in a situation where an issue could be determined with
more economy before conveyance.
DENNIS J. CAREY.

AMENDMENT TO THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT RELATING TO Ex-

AMINATIONS BEFORE TRiAL.-On March 24, 1948, Section 288 of the

Civil Practice Act was amended to provide that where a party to an
action or an original owner of a claim is a partnership or an individual doing business under his own or under an assumed or trade
name, the testimony of an agent or employee may be taken under the
same circumstances as would the deposition of an agent or employee
of a corporation. The amendment became effective on September
1, 1948.1
'Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 453. The section now reads: "Testimony by
deposition during pendency of action and before trial. Any party to an action
in a court of record may cause to be taken by deposition, before trial, his
own testimony or that of any other party which is material and necessary in
the prosecution or defense of the action. A party to such an action also may
cause to be so taken the testimony, which is material and necessary, of the
original owner of a claim which constitutes or from which arose, a cause of
action acquired by the adverse party by grant, conveyance, transfer, assignment or endorsement and which is set forth in his pleading as a cause of
action or counterclaim. When an adverse party, or an original owner of a
claim whose testimony may be taken by deposition, is a partnership, an individual conducting a business under his own name, or an individual doing
business under a trade or assumed name, the testimony of one or more of his
or their agents or employees, which is material and necessary, may be so taken.
Any party to such an action also may cause to be so taken the testimony of
any other person, which is material and necessary, where such person is about
to depart from the state, or is without the state, or resides at a greater distance from the place of trial than one hundred miles, or is so sick or infirm
as to afford reasonable grounds of belief that he will not be able to attend
the trial, or other special circumstances render it proper that his deposition
should be taken." (Amended matter in italics.)
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The provisions for examinations before trial as embodied in the
Civil Practice Act 2 have been in existence since 1920, but in their
original form and interpretation limited the examination of agents3
and employees to those actions which involved private corporations.
The privilege of examining municipal corporations through their employees was extended by the amendment of May 1, 1941, 4 and thus
both types of corporation were placed in the same position. Now,
with the passage of the most recent amendment to the Act, any business, whether a corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship can
be examined before trial through its agents or employees.
Prior to September 1, 1948, the employees of an individual or
of a partnership could only be examined by deposition in those limited circumstances enumerated in Section 288. Consequently, the
deposition of such employee was procurable only when his testimony
was material and necessary and it appeared that he would be unavailable at the trial. It is now possible to obtain and use the deposition of such a person in the same manner as the deposition of a
party to the action. Of course, where it was possible to name an
employee as a party defendant along with his employer, the plaintiff
could always take his testimony in an examination before trial. But,
except in those cases involving automobile accidents where the operator of the defendant's vehicle was someone other than the owner,
it was not ordinarily possible for the plaintiff to name as a party
defendant the employees whom it would be advantageous for him
to examine.
The purpose of an examination before trial is fourfold. It
shortens litigation by allowing the parties or party who has the right
of examination to determine in general what his opponent's testimony will be upon the trial. It narrows the issues on the trial by
allowing the parties or party who has the right of examination to
frame his pleadings according to known facts, as revealed by his own
knowledge and that of the party opponent. The deposition may also
be used as, or in lieu of, testimony at the trial, subject to the rules
of evidence governing its admissibility. Lastly, it encourages pretrial settlements and discontinuances of actions which are discovered
to be futile. The examination may reveal facts which would make
it impossible for the party to recover, and rather than bring the case
to trial under such circumstances the party will wisely discontinue.
The amendment which is now effective was brought into existence to further the purposes referred to above. It seeks to make it
possible to take the deposition of those persons who are, or should
be, in the best position to know what occurred. In the usual case
the owner of a business does not know the facts of an accident which
2 N. Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT §§ 288, 289 and 292-a.
3 N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 289.
4 N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 292-a.
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may have taken place while his employees and agents were working
in the furtherance of his business. An examination of such an employer would reveal none of the facts pertinent to the issues. Upon
the trial it is likely that he would not. testify as a witness in his own
behalf. Rather, he would attempt to refute the other party's case
by having those agents or employees who were present at the time
of the occurrence testify to the facts as known to them. It is now
no longer necessary to wait until the trial of the action to discover
the facts which such an employer will put into evidence through his
employees. They can be examined before trial just as the employer
could always be examined.
The amendment in question is significant in that it not only
places partnerships and individuals owning their own businesses on
the same footing as corporations, but also because it constitutes another step along the road toward a more liberal trial practice in New
York and a slightly closer emulation of the rules of practice in the
Federal Jurisdictions.5 During recent years there has been a noticeable tendency on the part of New York practitioners to be increasingly critical of the limitations and confusion of interpretations among
the four departments which comprise the Judicial System in New
York of the rules pertaining to examinations before trial. Those
persons who advocate the streamlining of our trial practice point to
the advantages to be derived from adopting the Federal Rules in
New York.6
Under the Federal Practice, the testimony of any person, whether
a party to the action or not, may be taken at the instance of any party
by deposition on oral examination or on written interrogatories for
the purpose of discovery, or for use as evidence, or for both purposes. 7 This means that a party plaintiff can examine any and all
of the defendant's witnesses as well as the party defendant, and the
defendant has the same right as to the plaintiff and his witnesses.
The purpose of the rule is to limit the pleadings to the simplest possible form and to permit the adverse party to obtain whatever information he needs by means of discovery rather than through the
pleadings.8
5 FED. R. Civ. P., 26 through 37, effective Sept. 16, 1938.
6 For a comparison of the New York and Federal Rules with criticisms
and suggested changes, see reprint of address by Mr. Leonard Saxe, Executive
Secretary, Judicial Council in 36 LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL 112 (1943).
7FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
8 "These Rules . . . clearly show that an attempt has been made to set

up a machinery by the operation of which a cause reaches actual trial stripped
to its essentials: with issues defined, clarified and narrowed, with both parties
(if properly diligent) thoroughly prepared to meet all possible issues and fortified against surprise, and with a record already complete, except as to those
matters which by their inherent nature can only be presented before a Trial
Judge. The formulation of the Rules and the development of the procedure
tend to hasten the day when the outcome of this class of litigation will depend
less upon the skill and strategic manoeuvering of respective counsel and more
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Under the New York doctrine, the examination must be material
and necessary to the prosecution or defense of the action. It is limited to his own testimony and that of the other party, and the only
provision made for the discovery of testimony of the adverse party's
witnesses is in those instances where the witness is about to leave
the state, or is absent from the state, or resides more than one hundred miles from the place of trial, or is seriously ill, or other special
circumstances require his deposition to be taken. 9 Furthermore, the
decisions in each of the four Judicial Departments vary as to whether
the necessity exists in any given case to allow an examination to the
defendant where he does not have the burden of proof, or whether
it will be limited to the plaintiff who usually has such burden.' 0 For
the sake of brevity only the First and Second Departments will be
compared in this regard. Under the ruling in the Second Department only the party having the burden of proof in the action can
examine the other party before trial."
In the vast majority of cases this limits the privilege to the
plaintiff, and forces the defendant to wait until the actual trial to
learn the exact issues which will be raised by the plaintiff.
A recent decision in the First Department has held that the
right to examine before trial belongs to all of the parties to the action, regardless of who has the burden of proof, and it appears that
this more liberal and sensible view will be adopted hereafter as the
rule in the First Department. 12
Rule 26(b) of the Federal Act raises another point for comparison between the doctrines of the two jurisdictions. This rule
expressly states that the deponent may be examined regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. It does not restrict the examinations
to matters relevant to the precise issue but only to matters relevant
to the subject matter involved in the action.' 3 The rule further provides that unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party may be
examined regarding any relevant matter "including the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."
New York's First Department strictly limits the subject matter
upon the merits of the issues involved."
27 F. Supp. 938, 941 (E. D. Pa. 1939).

Teller v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,

9N. Y. Civ. PRc. AcT § 288.

10 Ibid.

"1O'Boyle v. Home Ins. Co., 226 App. Div. 767, 234 N. Y. Supp. 259 (2d
Dep't 1929); Weber v. Deutschberger, - Misc. -, 45 N. Y. Supp. 2d 503
(Sup. Ct. 1943). The rule in these cases has been affirmed by implication in
the following: Fried v. Acme Backing Corporation, 269 App. Div. 844, 55
N. Y. Supp. 2d 479 (2d Dep't 1945); Bernstein v. Wittner, 266 App. Div.
743, 41 N. Y. Supp. 2d 230 (2d Dep't 1943).
12 Marie Dorros, Inc. v. Dorros Bros., App. Div. -, 80 N. Y. Supp. 2d
25 (1st Dep't 1948).
13 Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corporation, 27 F. Supp. 946 (D.
Conn. 1939).
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of the examination. If the action is one in negligence, the deposition must be restricted to matters dealing with ownership, agency,
operation and control; under no circumstances can the examination
be extended to touch upon issues of alleged negligence.1 4 The Second Department, on the other hand, allows a general examination
into the subject matter and substance of the action. The examiner
can delve into the negligence aspects of the case as well as those involving ownership, operation and control. 15
In New York there is no provision for the determination before
trial of the identity of the other party's witnesses.
Another section of the Federal Act which is deserving of comment is that which provides that if the party who receives a mental
or physical examination before trial at the instance of the other party
(the defendant), requests and obtains the physician's report, a mutuality of disclosure becomes mandatory.' 6 One of the purposes of the
rule is to make available testimony by an impartial witness as to
injuries on account of which damages are claimed. 17 Speaking of
this rule, one of the members of the United States Supreme Court's
Advisory Committee to draft rules of procedure for the lower federal courts has said:

"This provision . . . should prove an effec-

tive barrier to much malingering and fraudulent testimony (heretofore so difficult to rebut) as to the real physical or mental condition
of parties to civil actions. When such a condition is vital in actual
litigation, specious considerations of the oft asserted sanctity of the
body or mind and outmoded feelings of false modesty must yield to
expediency and the practical administration of justice in the courts." 1s
Under the New York law at the present time, such mutuality
of disclosure is not expressly required. Although Section 306 of
the New York Civil Practice Act authorizes the physical examination of a plaintiff at the instance of the defendant in a personal injuries action, the various Appellate Division departments are here
too in conflict as to whether the examining physician is required to
deliver a copy of his report to the plaintiff as well as to the defendant or his attorney.19 The First Department does not require that
the physician furnish such report to the plaintiff.2 0 In the Second
14 Klar v. City of New York, 165 Misc. 875, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1182 (Sup.
Ct. 1937). For a discussion of the rules as applied in the First Department,
see Parsons v. Moss, 171 Misc. 828, 13 N. Y. Supp. 2d 865 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
'5 Storm v. Gair, 212 App. Div. 829, 207 N. Y. Supp. 925 (2d Dep't 1925);
Samols v. Mayer, 120 Misc. 516, 199 N. Y. Supp. 754 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; Oshinsky
v. Gumberg, 188 App. Div. 23, 176 N. Y. Supp. 406 (2d Dep't 1919).
'GFED. R. Civ. P. 35.
17 Wadlow v. Humberd, 27 F. Supp. 210 (W. D. Mo. 1939).
18 Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. Rav. 261, 280
(1939).
19 PRASEKER,

NEW YORK PRACTICE 440

(1947).

Feinberg v. Fairmont Holding Corporation, 272 App. Div. 101, 69 N. Y. S.
2d 414 (1st Dep't 1947); Kelman v. Union Ry., 202 App. Div. 487, 195 N. Y
Supp. 313 (1st Dep't 1922).
20
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Department, on the other hand, the report must be delivered to the
plaintiff as well as to the defendant."
Depositions taken pursuant to the amendment which has been
under discussion will not be limited in their use upon the trial of
the action, to the impeaching of the witnesS. The legislative intent
was to liken the employees and agents of partnerships and individuals to similar persons in the employ of corporations, and if this
be admissible as evidence
intent is recognized, the depositions will
22
whether the witness is available or not.

The recent amendment to the New York Act which has been
under discussion falls far short of a complete adoption by this jurisdiction of the Federal Rules on examinations before trial. But if
it is an indication of more changes to come which will tend to simplify, unify and streamline the examination before trial doctrine in
New York, it should be considered as a legislative act of considerable
importance.
JOHN

B.

McGOVERN.

AMENDMENT OF MUNICIPAL COURT CODE PERMITTING PERSONAL SERVICE WITHOUT THE STATE IN LIEU OF PUBLICATION.-

That no man may be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law, is a principle firmly rooted in our democratic way
of life.1 But what is due process? Its definitions have been so
numerous and varied that it is well nigh impossible of exact and
comprehensive definition. 2 However, it has long been settled, that
due process requires judicial proceedings conducted before a court
of competent jurisdiction,3 and that the person proceeded against, be
entitled, as a matter of right, to notice and an opportunity to be
heard.4 Although notice is required, personal notice is not an in21

Horowitz v. B. & Q. T. Corporation, 171 Misc. 321, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 41

(N. Y. City Ct. 1939).
22

Masciarelli v. Delaware & Hudson R. R., 178 Misc. 458, 34 N. Y. S. 2d

550 (Sup. Ct. 1942); General Ceramics Co. v. Schenley Products Co., 262

App. Div. 528, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 540 (1st Dep't 1941). N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 303.
1U. S. CONsT. AMaNDS. V, XIV; N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I, § 6; Nebbia v.

New York, 291 U. S. 502 78 L. ed. 940 (1934) ; Pratt Institute v. City of
New York, 99 App. Div. 525, 91 N. Y. Supp. 136 (2d Dep't 1904) ; Roseman
v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 154 Misc. 320, 277 N. Y. Supp. 471
(N. Y. City Ct. 1935).
2 _ 'Due process of law' is process due according to the law of the land."
Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N. Y. 271, 300, 94 N. E. 431, 442 (1911).
"... law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice . ... "
People v. Dunn, 157 N. Y. 528, 537, 52 N. E. 572, 575 (1899). ". . . due
course of legal proceedings, according to those rules and forms which have
been established for the protection of private rights." Westervelt v. Gregg,
12 N. Y. 202, 209, 62 Am. Dec. 160, 163 (1854).
3 Matter of City of Buffalo, 139 N. Y. 422, 34 N. E. 1103 (1893).
4 Jenkins v. Young, 35 Hun 565 (N. Y. 1885); People ex rel. Scott v.

